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Hospital Nurses and Tort Liability
Gabrielle G. Kinkela* and Robert V. Kinkela**
A YOUNG FOOTBALL PLAYER suffers a leg injury. He is brought to a
hospital emergency room for treatment. The X-rays indicate a
fractured tibia and fibula, a cast is applied and the patient hospitalized.
This set of facts should, in due time, lead to the expected conclusion of
healing and the resumption of normal activity. However, an amputation
must be performed; certainly a drastic measure for a broken leg sus-
tained by an otherwise healthy, eighteen-year old boy. Even someone
completely removed from the medical scene might readily suspect im-
proper care; but who is responsible: the doctor, the nurse or the hos-
pital? In 1965, the Illinois courts were faced with precisely these issues
in the Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital case.'
Some of the salient facts disclosed were that: 1) the hospital was
fully accredited by the Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation and
was duly licensed under Illinois state law; 2) the attending physician
was not an orthopedic surgeon, nor had he kept pace with progress in
this particular area; 3) no consultation was requested, nor were other
satisfactory measures taken when symptoms, recorded on the nurse's
notes and readily observable, clearly indicated that such steps ought to
be taken.2 The facts seem to illustrate a typical situation found in
medical malpractice suits. Negligence and corresponding liability should
then, logically, be fixed on the physician. Interject a pre-trial settlement
with the physician, 3 and the plaintiff's ostensible cause of action appears
to have vanished. Not so, said the court, and held the hospital negligent
for not insuring adequate medical supervision.4 Furthermore, it at-
tributed negligence to the nurses for failure to report their observations
to higher medical and administrative authority.5 One year later, the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,6 leaving the case open
to numerous interpretations.
Rather than being considered a maverick of the judicial process,
* B.A., Seton Hill College; M.N., Case Western Reserve Univ.; Fourth-year student
at Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Director of Nursing Service at St. Vincent Char-
ity Hospital (Cleveland).
** B.S., Univ. of Pittsburgh; B.S.N., Case Western Reserve University; Fourth-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Director of Nursing at Sagamore Hills
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1 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert. den., 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
2 Ibid.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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the Darling case, 7 reflects some of the emerging concepts of tort liability.
The court not only pinpointed the nurse's responsibility, under this set
of circumstances,8 it also made decisions relevant to the extent of hos-
pital liability and the standard by which such liability is to be judged.
There is no doubt that these determinations, which will be considered
at length, have significant overtones for the hospital nurse.
What factors have influenced the courts in the development of
their current attitude toward hospitals? Are the emerging concepts
reasonable, or are they indicia of a pendulum swinging too far in the
direction of the patient? What are the consequences for the nurse?
These are the questions to which the ensuing treatment of one aspect
of tort liability is addressed.
Current Status of Charitable Immunity
The Darling case, together with its other far-reaching consequences,
also disposes of whatever remnants were left in Illinois of the charitable
immunity doctrine.9 Appearing first in this country in 1876,10 it has,
for nearly a century, encased voluntary, non-profit hospitals in a protec-
tive cloak. Under the doctrine, hospitals may be relieved of liability for
the negligent acts of their servants. A variety of theories evolved to
support it," and it retained considerable vitality until the past decade.
Its approaching end was presaged in the landmark Avellone v. St. John's
Hospital 12 case of 1956. Today, we are witnesses to its near total de-
mise, with less than a handful of states retaining it." An explanation
of its failure to survive is provided by an articulate justice of the
7 Ibid.
s Id.
9 Id.
10 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529
(1876).
11 The trust fund theory is rationalized on the premise that the donor intends his
funds to be used for charitable purposes, and using such funds to pay for damages
would be a misappropriation. (Inherent in this theory is the belief that donors
would be discouraged from contributing to charitable institutions.) The waiver
theory holds that a patient, entering a non-profit hospital, impliedly agrees not to
sue his benefactors, should an injury be incurred through negligence. The non-
applicability of respondeat superior, providing due care is used in the selection and
retention of employees. The public policy theory, whose adherents maintain that
denial of immunity would be an offense to the public and charity equally. Rabon v.
Towan Memorial Hospital, 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
12 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
13 Total Immunity:
Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hospital, 349 Mass. 765, 208 N.E.2d 232 (1965).
Decker v. Bishop of Charleston, 247 S.C. 317, 147 S.E.2d 264 (1966).
Koprivica v. Bethesda General Hospital, 410 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1966).
Hill v. Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital, 200 So.2d 34 (La. App. 1967).
Immunity Limited to Charitable Funds:
Hemenway v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n. of Colorado, 419 P.2d 312 (Col. S. Ct.
1966).
Rhoda v. Aroostock General Hospital, 226 A.2d 530 (Me. S. Ct. 1967).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court.14 In the 1956 decision, 15 abrogating the
doctrine for that state, Justice Musmanno stated:
Thus, as a matter of integrity in nomenclature it must be stated
that although the hospitals here under discussion are known as
charitable hospitals, it does not follow that they offer their services
through the operation of charity."6
Consideration of justice,17 and the doctrine's historical background,
prompted the observation that charitable institutions today are housed
in mighty edifices, use the latest scientific equipment, and operate on
a business-like basis.'8 The conclusion was that whatever justification
there may have been for the doctrine's acceptance in the past, has been
lost in the realities of the present. 19
It is proposed that this opinion 20 can be validly interpreted to mean
that: 1) hospitals are big business, which have joined the mainstream
of American life; 2) justice, not precedent or hazy considerations of
the party defendant, must be the court's prime consideration; and
3) doctrines with no basis in fact do not constitute a tenable defense.
The impact of these developments on hospital nursing is of parallel
importance. Prior to the demise of hospital immunity, the nurse could
be held solely liable for her negligent acts.21 Today, with hospitals
generally answering for negligent acts of their servants, under the rule
of respondeat superior,22 emphasis should be shifting away from the
nurse. However, careful analysis produces an almost paradoxical in-
ference. With hospitals now being subject to more frequent litigation, 23
the nurse can expect a concurrent involvement to a comparable degree.
Because of her responsibilities for direct patient care, and her com-
14 "A person may recover damages if he is injured as a result of negligence in a
hotel, theater, street car, skating rink, natatorium, bowling alley, train or ship, yet
he cannot recover if he is hurt in the place where accidents are considered most
unlikely to occur-in a hospital where one goes to be cured of an already existing
infirmity and not to be saddled with additional woe and torment. This is indeed the
paradox of paradoxes. It has no logic, reason and least of all logic to support it. And
still more paradoxical is the argument that by refusing recovery to the victim of a
hospital's own negligence, one somehow is serving charity." Flagiello v. Pennsyl-
vania, 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193, 197 (1965).
15 Flagiello v. Pennsylvania, supra note 14.
16 Id. at 196.
17 "But charity will never be true charity unless it takes justice into account." Pope
Pius XI Encyclical Letter, "Divini Redemptoris." Paulist Press Ed. at 22; supra note
14, footnote at 196.
18 See text, supra note 14.
19 Ibid. See, Oleck, Non-Profit Corps., Orgns. & Assns., §§ 56, 57 (2d ed. 1965).
20 Id.
21 Purowski v. Bridgeport Hospital, 144 Conn. 531, 134 A.2d 834 (1957).
22 Parmenter v. Osteopathic General Hospital, 196 So.2d 505 (Fla. App. 1967);
Moore v. Jefferson Hospital, Inc., 208 Va. 352, 158 S.E.2d 124 (1967).
23 40 Hospitals, 111 (Oct., 1966).
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manding role in the hospital's internal structure, the nurse's acts are
destined for closer and more exacting scrutiny by the courts.
The Hospital Nurse
In the modern hospital, the "master coordinator," if you will, is the
professional nurse. She functions within a complex maze of facilities,
equipment, departments and divisions of personnel. There is but a
single unifying force-the patient. All available resources, human and
mechanical, exist for his benefit. If he is to reap maximum benefit, all
hospital services, whether they involve direct or indirect patient care,
must be carefully and consistently coordinated. The most qualified
personnel and most sophisticated devices are of no avail, unless they
reach the patient who needs them when he needs them. The singularly
unique patient-nurse relationship provides the enabling vehicle for the
requisite synchronization of time, people, places and things. The privi-
lege, albeit an onerous one, is incurred by virtue of what we refer to as
the "you are there" doctrine. To the department of nursing service is
relegated the responsibility of providing patient care on a twenty-four
hour a day, seven day a week basis. Other departments and their per-
sonnel operate on a normal work day or an on-call basis. The nurse
remains as the individual having the closest, most continuous and most
comprehensive patient contact. Her role as "master coordinator" is the
predictable sequitur. Significant though it may be, it is but one facet
of nursing practice.
The Nature of Nursing Practice
In the Model Act,24 drafted by the American Nurses Association,25
nursing practice is defined as follows:
The practice of professional nursing means the performance
for compensation of any act in the observation, care and counsel of
the ill, injured or infirm, or in the maintenance of health or pre-
vention of illness of others or in the supervision and teaching of
other personnel, or in the administration of medications and treat-
ments as prescribed by a licensed physician or dentist; requiring
substantial specialized judgment and skill and based on knowl-
edge and application of the principles of biological, physical and
social science. The foregoing shall not be deemed to include acts
of diganosis or prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures. 26
The phrase, "for compensation," iz included to indicate inapplica-
bility to family members or friends giving gratuitous care to a sick per-
24 Am. Nurses Ass'n; Model Act-Suggestions for Major Provisions to be Included in
a Nursing Act (Rev. 1964).
25 The Am. Nurses Ass'n. is the official organization of the nursing profession.
26 Supra note 24, § X at 24.
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son.27 Of greatest significance is the portion which reads "perform-
ance . . . of any act . . . requiring substantial judgment . . ." 28 This
element will be of cardinal importance in evaluating some of the cases
selected for detailed discussion.
The basic components of the Model Act 29 have been incorporated
into the statutes of those states where licensure is mandatory. 30 Man-
datory licensure bars the performance of professional nursing functions
by anyone other than a duly licensed professional nurse.31 Presently,
more than forty states have adopted mandatory licensure. 32
In the minority states having permissive law, the only prohibition is
that unlicensed individuals, performing professional nursing functions,
may not use the title of Registered Nurse, or use the abbreviation R.N.33
An obvious defect of permissive licensure, inter alia, is its imposition of
responsibility on the layman, for determining whether persons perform-
ing professional nursing functions are, in fact, qualified to do so. 34
Inherent in the statutory language of most states is not only what
is expected, but indeed required, of the professional nurse practitioner.
Guidelines are also available to assist in the implementation of man-
datory licensure acts and to help determine standards of practice. 3
The latter has been a source of vital concern to the American Nurses
Association, which recently appointed representatives from five dif-
ferent clinical areas to set standards for clinical nursing practice.3 6 The
profession thus declares, promulgates, enforces and evaluates standards
of practice.37
The functions of the general duty nurse, with whom patients or-
dinarily have the most contact, have also been specifically identified.38
27 Ibid.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Example: "Practice of professional nursing means the performance for compen-
sation of the acts requiring substantial judgment and specialized skills based on
knowledge and application of scientific principles learned in an approved school of
professional nursing. Acts of medical diagnosis and prescription of medical, thera-
peutic or corrective medical measures by a nurse are prohibited." Ohio Rev. Code,
§ 4723.06 (1968).
31 Ohio Nurses Ass'n., Why a Bill for Mandatory Licensure, 3 (1967).
32 Ibid.
33 Id.
84 Mandatory v. Permissive Licensure for Nurses, 195 Am. Med. Assn. 496-7 (Feb.,
1966).
35 Ohio Nurses Ass'n., Guidelines for the Utilization of Nursing Personnel (1967).
36 2 Am. Nurses Assn., A.N.A. in Action, No. 2 (March-April 1968).
37 Ibid.
38 Am. Nurses Assn., Functions, Standards and Qualifications for Practice (Rev.
Feb., 1963).
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(For a broad distinction, based on scope of responsibility, between the
general duty nurse and other levels of professional nurses as they exist
in most hospitals, see footnote 39.) These are summarized below:
The general duty nurse is aware of the total nursing needs of the
patient and is responsible for seeing that they are fulfilled. This
includes such specifics as:
1. The preparation, administration and supervision of a patient
care plan for each patient for whom she is responsible.
2. The application of scientific principles in performing nursing
procedures and techniques through constant evaluation in the
light of nursing and medical progress.
3. The performance of therapeutic measures prescribed and dele-
gated by medical authority.
4. Continuous evaluation of symptoms, reactions and progress
which requires observation, recording and reporting to the ap-
propriate person.
5. Assistance in patient education and rehabilitation.
6. Assistance in providing optimum physical and emotional en-
vironment.
7. The teaching and directing of nonprofessional personnel for
whom she is responsible. 40
It is of value to note that most of these areas are independent func-
tions which the nurse has the right to perform. The only area in which
the nurse is not permitted to function independently is in the per-
formance of prescribed therapeutic measures. (Number three above).
In this instance, she must act under the order and the direction and/or
supervision of a duly licensed physician, (she must) comprehend the
cause and effect of that order, and the order must be legal.4 '
In considering the nursing functions, as set forth herein, the ques-
tion arises whether the Darling decision,42 by identifying the nurse, in
effect, as a guardian over medical treatment, imposed a new responsi-
bility or elaborated on an existing one. As stated in number four above,
the nurse is to continuously evaluate the patient's condition, which re-
quires observation, recording and reporting to the appropriate per-
son. Usually, the appropriate persons, to whom the nurse reports, are
the attending physician (or his delegate) and the nursing supervisor.
The physician appraises the information and makes his own determina-
39 Director of Nursing Service-Responsible for patient care on all units. (Unit,
ward and floor are synonymous.)
Supervisor-Responsible for patient care on two or more units.
Head Nurse-Responsible for care of all patients on one unit on a 24 hour basis.
General duty or staff nurse-Responsible for care of those patients assigned to
her during the time she is on duty.
40 Am. Nurses Assn., op. cit. supra note 38 at 12.
41 Lesnik, M., and Anderson, B., Nursing Practice and the Law, 277 (2nd ed. 1962).
42 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital, supra note 1.
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tions. The nursing supervisor reports to her superior when the infor-
mation indicates that some action should be taken which is beyond her
scope of authority. If the problem cannot be handled within the de-
partment of nursing service, the director informs the hospital ad-
ministrator. 43 It is within the discretion of the hospital administrator
to put whatever machinery is required, for a solution, into motion.
This situation44 (medical management of the patient) was a problem for
the appropriate medical body in that particular hospital.45 From the
case,40 as reported, one concludes that the nurses followed standard
procedure. It is difficult, therefore, to comprehend how and where they
failed in their duty. The responsibility for evaluating patient progress
and reporting through proper channels is one matter. The possible con-
sequences, were a nurse to report directly to higher medical authority
(unless specifically authorized to do so) is quite a different theory to
contemplate. One flagrant defect might be the inference that nurses who
did so were not guarding the patient's care, but rather were attempting
to supervise medical management. Another obvious flaw is a considera-
tion of whether or not such a responsibility is a fair one for the nurse
to shoulder. It remains a delicate area open to deliberation, both in and
out of the court room.
Standard of Care
It is generally accepted that tort liability for negligence rests on
three premises: 1) the existence of a foreseeable duty; 2) the breach
of such duty; and 3) resulting injury, with the breach being the proxi-
mate cause. 47 That the hospital has a duty to exercise such reasonable
care and attention as the patient's physical and mental condition war-
rants4" is also evident. However, the precise duty imposed in a given
situation, the identification of a specific breach, and determination of
whether or not the alleged breach was the proximate cause of injury,
are questions which continue to preplex judge and jury.
The "community" or "locality" standard has been frequently (but
not always) resorted to as an aid in making such determinations. The
usual phraseology, as well as its general acceptance, is illustrated in a
1952 case: 49
43 Following proper channels of communications seems cumbersome but it can be
accomplished rapidly in a hospital setting, when the need is urgent.
44 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital, supra note 1.
45 Ibid.
46 Id.
47 Prosser, Torts, 146 (3rd Ed. 1964).
48 26 Am. Jur., Hospitals and Asylums, § 18. See also, 41 C.J.S., Hospitals, § 8-C (3)
at 349-50; Shover v. Iowa Lutheran Hospital, 252 Ia. 706, 107 N.W.2d 85 (1961).
49 Garfield Memorial Hospital v. Marshall, 204 F.2d 721 (Ct. App. D.C. 1952).
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This duty (of care) is measured by the degree of care, skill
and diligence customarily exercised by hospitals generally in the
community. 0
In another case, 51 the same standard of care when applied to nurses,
is described as that generally exercised by reputable nurses in the com-
munity.
In the late fifties, there were indications of the court's growing
reluctance to rely on the rule as faithfully as they had in the past. The
defendants (hospital and nurse) in a California case, 52 sought to avoid
liability by urging adherence to the locality rule. The State Supreme
Court held that while proof of practice or custom may assist in de-
termining what constitutes due care, it is not conclusive in establishing
the standard of care.53 This might have been a forecast of things to
come, but the rule continued to flourish.54
By 1965 it was possible to discern a palpable trend away from the
locality rule in several significant decisions. In the previously cited
Darling case,55 Justice Schaefer flatly rejected its applicability to a
fully accredited hospital. He declared that custom will not prevail where
it does not conform to the required standard. 56 To emphasize the ruling,
the court used the words of Judge Learned Hand, pronounced twenty-
three years earlier, where it was suggested that a whole calling may
have lagged in "the adoption of new and available devices," or uni-
versally disregarded "imperative precautions." 57
That same year, 5  the West Virginia courts equated acceptable
standards with "standards of care in accredited hospitals throughout the
United States." 59
A new dimension was added by Wisconsin's Supreme Court in
1966.60 In the opinion, professional standards were viewed in the light
of what the public expects., 1 The expectation of high standards of care
was given added import, by the court's referral to it as a public right.6 2
50 Id. at 239.
51 Mundt v. Alta Bates Hospital, 223 Cal.2d 413, 35 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1962).
52 Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 (1956).
53 Ibid.
54 Goff v. Doctor's Hospital, 166 Cal. App. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 29 (1958); Carrigan v.
Roman Catholic Bishop, 104 N.H. 73, 178 A.2d 502 (1962).
55 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital, supra note 1.
56 Ibid.
57 Id. at 257.
58 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital, supra note 1.
59 Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, 149 W.Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754, 762 (1965).
60 Carson v. City of Beloit, 32 Wis.2d 282, 145 N.W.2d 112 (1966).
61 Ibid.
62 Id.
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Another 1966 case,6 3 explicitly and dramatically illustrates the wan-
ing influence of the locality rule.
On November 14, 1963, a baby was born prematurely in a naval
hospital. The infant was placed in an isolette (an improved incubator)
which controls temperature, humidity and oxygen content. It also
affords protection from the organisms or germs found in the normal
environment. Both the facilities and personnel appeared to be adequate.
However, twelve days later, "grossly purulent" material was removed
from the infant's hip. The organisms were cultured and identified. An
examination, five weeks later, revealed a permanent dislocation of the
right hip and deterioration of the left hip. There was reasonable antici-
pation that this would cause pain as the child grew older. Conse-
quently, the parents brought an action against the hospital for negli-
gence.64
At the trial, there was testimony that nose and throat cultures had
been obtained from the nursing staff. A positive culture had been found
on one of its members, a Corps Wave. Under the hospital's nursing
regulations, this category of personnel was prohibited from "handling
or ministering to infants of the plaintiff's age and development." 65
Further testimony revealed that: 1) no physical examination was
performed nor were any nose and throat cultures taken, prior to the
Wave's being assigned to the nursery; and 2) the Wave did, in the
course of her duties, have occasion to minister to the child.66 From
these facts, the court concluded that: "at some critical time before
November 26 (date infection was discovered) the Corps Wave did in
fact handle the child." 67
Expert testimony for determining whether or not the Wave's and
infant's culture were the same, was provided by the hospital pathologist
and an out-of-state specialist in microbiology. Upon this evidence,"
the court concluded that there was no substantial difference between
the two cultures.
The vital issue remaining was whether or not failure to take cul-
tures and examine the Wave, before assigning her to nursery duty,
constituted negligence.6 9
The community standard rule was urged as a defense, 70 with the
hospital pathologist testifying that the requirement of periodic cultures
63 Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F.Supp. 732 (D.C. S.C. 1966).
64 Ibid.
65 Id. at 737.
66 Kapuschinsky v. United States, supra note 63.
67 Id. at 738.
68 Kapuschinsky v. United States, supra note 63.
69 Ibid.
70 Id.
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was impractical and not the usual practice in that area. The testimony
of the out-of-state specialist conflicted regarding the desirability of the
practice.7 1
The court strongly rejected the locality rule and held that the
hospital was negligent.7 2 Notwithstanding the general practice in the
community, the hospital, by its failure to take a known precaution, had
breached its duty to this infant.73
It would seem that the position adopted by the court above,74 dis-
poses of the locality rule in its entirety. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington made a further distinction.75 It considered the factors involved
in hospital accreditation and held that a hospital could not be excused
from measuring up to national standards, whether it was "accredited or
not." 76 The rationale of the court defies contradiction. In weighing the
merits of the locality rule, the court reflected on its historical back-
ground. It agreed to its applicability at a point in time when there was
little inter-community travel; when a small town doctor did not have the
same opportunity or resources as a colleague practicing in a large city;
when keeping abreast of professional advances was extremely difficult.77
Today, with modern methods of communication, such as closed circuit
television, professional journals, etc., the same elements can no longer
be considered as controlling in the determination of standards.75
Nursing licensure has been the cause of further erosion. In a re-
cent decision, 79 the community standard was rejected because it con-
flicted with the state's licensure statute.
The progression from community to national standards should have
a special connotation for the nurse, not only when she is a defendant in
the court room but in a preventive manner as well. There are instances
when doctors and hospital administrator urge the nurse to adopt a par-
ticular procedure on the ground that "all the other hospitals in the area
are doing it." Certainly, usage and custom are relevant, but they should
not be the controlling elements in altering old or establishing new
nursing practices.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Pederson v. Dumouschel, 431 P.2d 973 (Wash. S.Ct. 1967).
76 Ibid.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Barber v. Reinking, 68 Wash.2d 139, 411 P.2d 861 (1966).
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The Doctor-Nurse Relationship
The doctor and nurse are committed to a common goal; the best
possible patient care. Achieving this mutual objective requires a close
working relationship. It is the doctor's responsibility to prescribe thera-
peutic measures and the nurse's job is to carry out such orders. If she
does this efficiently, all is well. Superficial analysis leads to this un-
cluttered conjecture. The Darling decision, ° as already described, de-
manded more and set forth a crystalline illustration of the various
subtleties interwoven into the pattern of the doctor-nurse relationship.
It is an accepted tenet that the nurse is required to execute all
physician's orders which are legal.8s Failure to do so is tantamount to
negligence.8 2 Conversely, carrying out a physician's order, when the
patient's condition contraindicates it, may also be deemed a negligent
act.8 3 The dividing line is in the exercise of the nurse's skilled and in-
dependent judgment.
A case in point was recently litigated in Missouri.8 4 The physician
wrote a medication order with directions as to when it was to be ad-
ministered. He requested a nurse to give one ampule of the drug and
left the hospital without furnishing further instructions. The nurse
asked the intern to inject the medication. He did so and cardiac stand-
still resulted. The patient's husband brought a wrongful death action,s5
alleging negligence on the part of the attending physician, the intern and
the nurse. The attending physician attempted to shift the liability by
filing a cross-complaint asserting: 1) that the intern and two nurses
ordered, mixed, prepared and handled the drug; 2) that the intern and
two nurses had administered or caused the drug to be administered;
3) if any negligence is found resulting in damage to the plaintiff, then
such damage was caused solely by the co-defendants' negligence.8 ,
The drug ordered was unusual and potent, requiring the specialized
skill and knowledge of an anesthesiologist for its proper administra-
tion. The medicine label provided ample warning of these facts. On
this evidence, the court found the attending physician negligent in or-
dering the medication and the intern negligent for administering it. s 7
The nurses, who as hospital employees had the patient under their di-
rection and control, were also found negligent in failing to read the
literature which would have warned them of the necessary precau-
80 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital, supra note 1.
81 Lesnik v. Anderson, supra note 41.
82 Adams v. State, 429 P.2d 109 (Wash. S.Ct. 1967).
83 Arnold v. Haggin Memorial Hospital, 415 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. S.Ct. 1967).
84 Campbell v. Preston, 379 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. S.Ct. 1964).
85 Ibid.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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tions.88 (Missouri is one of the few remaining charitable immunity
states,s9 which explains why the hospital was not involved in the suit).
Another illustration of the imperative need for the nurse to clearly
understand an order before executing it, came before Delaware's Su-
preme Court in 1961.90 The nurse properly questioned the dosage of a
medication order. However, when the mode of administration was not
specified, she did not check with the physician, but rather used her
own discretion, based on past experience. She was in error and the
court found her liable for failure to use ordinary care in the execution
of her duties.9 1
There are many variations on the theme of the physician's order.
Thus, a nurse who fails to execute an order,9 2 or who executes an order
which is contraindicated by the patient's condition,93 or who, in any
way, participates in the improper execution of an order,94 may be found
negligent.
Failure, by the nurse, to follow accepted procedure or use the proper
technique may also result in injury to the patient. Although the nurse
under these circumstances in executing a physician's order, it is she
who breaches a duty, not the physician. Examples are found in cases
where: 1) the patient developed "drop foot" as a result of an improperly
administered intramuscular injection; 95 2) infection resulted from the
use of an unsterile needle; 91 3) postoperative infection resulted from
failure to observe proper technique.9 7
If one cardinal rule can be extracted from the preceding discussion,
it is that the nurse is responsible for her own acts. She is further re-
quired to exercise skilled judgment in the performance of such acts;
notwithstanding the fact that they are executed pursuant to a doctor's
order. A phrase heard by most nurses on more than one occasion is,
"Don't worry. I wrote the order, I'll take the responsibility." Well-
intentioned though they may be, such words should not lull the nurse
into a false sense of security. What is being offered as assurance is
clearly not within the physician's province: nor indeed, within the prov-
ince of anyone other than the nurse herself.
88 Id.
89 See cases cited supra note 13.
90 Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hospital, 176 A.2d 362 (Del. S.Ct. 1961).
91 Ibid.
92 Adams v. State, supra note 82.
93 Arnold v. Haggin Memorial Hospital, supra note 83.
94 Campbell v. Preston, supra note 84; Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hospital, supra
note 90.
95 Honeywell v. Rogers, 251 F.Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
96 Kalmus v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, 132 Cal. App.2d 243, 281 P.2d 872 (1955)
97 Helman v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 62 Wash.2d 136, 381 P.2d 605 (1963).
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The Legal Position of the Nurse
The hospital nurse is, generally, considered to be an employee or
agent of the hospital. 98 Since she is hired, assigned and responsible to
the hospital, the rule of respondeat superior applies. 0
In certain situations, the hospital nurse becomes the servant of the
doctor.100 The prime example is the nurse in the operating room.
Under the "captain of the ship" doctrine, the operating surgeon is re-
sponsible for the acts of the nurses who assist him.10 1 Even though the
nurse is employed by the hospital, she becomes the borrowed servant
while the surgical procedure is in progress.10 2 The borrowed servant doc-
trine relates back to the doctrine of respondeat superior, being founded
primarily on the right to direct and supervise.
10 3
The question of whether the operating room nurse is the servant of
the doctor or the hospital becomes a pivotal issue in cases where a
sponge has been inadvertently left in the patient.'0 4 In such situations,
a distinction is made between medical and ministerial acts of the
nurse. 10 5 Ministerial acts have been defined as those "requiring the
exercise of a particular skill acquired or developed by training and do
not involve the exercise of any professional judgment." 106 The resolu-
tion of this issue (medical or ministerial) fixes liability.107 Most juris-
dictions have held sponge counts to be ministerial acts for which the
hospital is liable.' 0 8 Total agreement on this question has not, however,
been achieved. 10 9
A major point of dispute also exists relative to the nurse's status as
a professional person. The courts freely refer to the nursing "pro-
fession." 110 There is, however, a remarkable degree of confusion as
98 Gormely v. Montana Deaconess Hospital, 423 P.2d 301 (Wash. S.Ct. 1967).
99 Ibid.
100 Harrison v. Wilkerson, 405 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn. App. 1966).
101 Ibid.
102 McKinney v. Tromly, 386 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
103 Danks v. Maher, 177 So.2d 412 (La. App. 1965).
104 Rural Educational Assn. v. Bush, 41 Tenn. App. 701, 298 S.W.2d 761 (1956);
Buzan v. Mercy Hospital, 203 So.2d 11 (Fla. App. 1967).
105 Ibid.
106 Danks v. Maher, supra note 103 at 417.
107 Rural Education Ass'n. v. Bush, Buzan v. Mercy Hospital, supra note 104. See
also, Oleck, Doctor, Lawyer & Hospital Administrator: A New Triangle, 8 Clev-Mar.
L. R. 416 (1959).
108 Ibid.; Danks v. Maher, supra note 103.
109 Klema v. St. Elizabeth Hospital, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960); see Har-
rison v. Wilkerson, supra note 100.
11o Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 417 P.2d 816 (Hawaii S.Ct. 1966); Kalmus v.
Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, supra note 96. Even a veterinarian is viewed as "a pro-
fessional" in treating a dog. See, Oleck, Veterinarian's Malpractice, The Practicing
Veterinarian (6) 164 (Nov.-Dec. 1966).
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to the precise meaning of the term. An Ohio case exemplifies this
confusion."'
An obstetrical patient fell out of bed while in the labor room.
Nursing negligence was at issue. 112 The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff.113 The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's de-
cision, 114 based on the rationale that the standard of care, required of
the nurse in that particular set of circumstances, had to be shown by
expert testimony. The state Supreme Court reversed the Appellate de-
cision,1 15 with the pronouncement that six of the jurors had been wo-
men who probably know more about childbirth than many experts. In
addition to this carrousel of opinions, there was an articulate dissent in
the State's high court. The dissenting opinion included these observa-
tions: 1) nursing is a recognized profession and a nurse's acts should
be evaluated accordingly, i.e., in the light of a malpractice action; 2)
although the hospital is liable, it is the servant's acts which are at issue;
3) the standards of care are, therefore, those applicable to a professional
nurse; 4) evidence testifying to the duties and discretion of a staff nurse,
under this set of circumstances, is required; 5) it is not childbirth which
is at issue, but the nurse's conduct, making the fact that some of thejurors were women irrelevant. 116 The opinion was concluded with the
comment that:
Malpractice has been traditionally distinct from other negli-
gence actions. The distinction lies not just in analytical differences
but in recognizing the human factor that patients and jurors tend
to expect too much. . . . Failure becomes proof of incompetence.
The law of malpractice has partially controlled this by a stricter
application of the rules of evidence and by emphasis, in instruc-
tions . 117
The dissenting opinion"" offers a forthright acceptance of the
nurse's professional status while challenging the Court's failure to pro-
vide equal treatment for the nurse.
Another Ohio case 1 9 dealt with the same problem, but with a
different emphasis. At issue was whether or not the statute of limita-
tions for malpractice was applicable when the alleged tort-feasor was a
111 Jones v. Hawkes Hospital of Mt. Carmel, 175 Ohio St. 503, 199 N.E.2d 592 (1964)
112 Ibid.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 512.
118 Jones v. Hawkes Hospital of Mt. Carmel, supra note 111.
119 Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964).
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nurse.120 The State Supreme Court held that it did not.121 In reaching
its decision, the court first looked to legislative intent, then added that a
nurse could not be placed in the same category as a physician, who
exercises his independent judgment in matters of life and death. 122
Further clouding the nurse's professional status are decisions pre-
ceding 123 and succeeding 24 the above Ohio case 125 , which extend to
nurses the same degree of care as that owed by physicians. California
courts treat the problem matter-of-factly by simply referring to mal-
practice as "the neglect of a physician or a nurse .... , 126
That the professional status of the nurse is not clearly established
in the courts is evident. However, dissent and variance in certain situa-
tions have been known to be the first indicia of a changing attitude.
Conclusions
The abrogation of charitable immunity, in all but a few jurisdic-
tions, 127 has been a signal development in the history of voluntary non-
profit hospitals. The courts have exposed the doctrine in its true light
and have found it to be a creature of fiction.128 Whatever propriety it
may once have had, it clearly has no bearing on the hospitals of today.
Its dissolution is having a material effect on the long prevailing mystique
surrounding hospitals. Their doors are now open to critical scrutiny,
with ever increasing regularity. The total hospital personality is being
analyzed. Sociological, economic and scientific forces are prodding,
nudging and driving the courts to this end. Our space age culture, with
its rapidly growing social sophistication, was bound to find this kind of
expression. With hospitals constituting the third largest industry in
the United States,1 29 it would be sheer fantasy to think they could have
remained isolated and apart.
In the last few decades, we have seen another evolutionary process.
Its beginnings were in a few faint mutterings that custom and usage
could not be considered conclusive in determining standards of care. 130
The locality rule, in its original historical setting, 3 1 was not a myth. It
120 Ibid.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Norton v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 144 So.2d 249 (La. App. 1962).
124 Powell v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y., 185 So.2d 324 (La. App. 1966); Louis
Chinese Hospital Assn., 249 Cal. 2774, 57 Cal.Rptr. 906 (1967).
125 Richardson v. Doe, supra note 119.
126 Louis v. Chinese, supra note 124 at 915.
127 Cases cited supra note 13, and see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corps., Orgns. & Assns.
§§ 56, 57 (2d ed. 1965).
128 Flagiello v. Pennsylvania, supra note 14.
129 68 Am. J., Nursing (No. 7) (July, 1968).
130 Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, supra note 52.
131 Pederson v. Dumouschel, supra note 75.
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has merely outlived its usefulness. When it proved inadequate, the
courts were compelled to find new yardsticks. These first emerged when
it became apparent that the care in hospitals accredited by national as-
sociations needed to be measured by national standards.132 Soon, even
this seemed inadequate to the task. Public interest and public rights
assumed a new prominence in judicial reasoning. 133 The courts are now
saying the public is not concerned with whether a hospital is accredited
or not,134 nor should it be. Inherent in those declarations is the impli-
cation that when an institution holds itself out as a center for the care
of the sick, it must be prepared to provide quality care; not just some
hospitals, but all hospitals.
When we refer to hospitals, we are really talking about people;
people who carry out the hospital's reason for being. The plaintiff in
the court room is not merely saying that the hospital failed in its duty
to him, he is saying that the hospital failed because certain persons
were negligent in caring for him. These persons quite frequently are
the nurses. As the people most closely involved with the patient on a
continual basis, this is an inevitable result. As the nurse's qualifications,
skill and knowledge increase, so will her responsibility for patient care.
The doctor-nurse relationship and the nurse's legal status are so
closely interrelated, that one cannot be considered apart from the other.
Assessing their over-all import is a difficult process. Within the context
of the hospital's internal structure, it becomes a tripartite issue, involving
the hospital administrator, the doctor and the nurse. Each of the parties
may subscribe to widely divergent philosophies. The consequences of
such conflict are self-evident, with the realization of the unique inter-
dependency existing among these three people. There are, on the other
side of the spectrun, hospitals where mutual respect and recognition
make it possible for problems to be solved wisely and uneventfully.
Until this is universally true, the nurse will continue to be exposed to
confusing pressures. The "you are there" doctrine, mentioned earlier,
probably accounts for a major share of them. There are many things
in the usual hospital routine which simply must be done and cannot
wait for another day. If other personnel are unavailable, it is, perhaps,
only natural that they be delegated to the person who is there twenty-
four hours a day. The fact that they are non-nursing functions is fre-
quently ignored. The unavailability of medical house staff (interns and
residents) may be one of the more frequent, and more serious, causes
for this kind of dilemma. Someone must assume their duties; why not
the nurse? When this question arises, the nurse magically inherits
qualities hitherto unnoticed. "Any good nurse could do this" or "let's
132 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital, supra note 1.
133 Carson v. City of Beloit, supra note 60.
134 Pederson v. Dumouschel, supra note 75.
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give the nurse the credit due her" are phrases which flow generously.
It is unlikely that they will come from the direction of a knowledgeable
nurse. Such a nurse accepts the fact that her role is not a static one
and change is inevitable. She is aware that she possesses special skills
and is anxious to apply them to their best advantage. She further realizes
that non-nurses cannot determine nursing practice. To permit them to
do so would be an abdication of professional responsibility. If a new
duty can be identified as a proper nursing function, but requires addi-
tional preparation to qualify nurses to carry it out properly, it follows
that the necessary time must be allocated before putting it into effect.
This does not mean the patient will not have the care and treatment he
requires. It does not mean the nurse is oblivious to scientific advances,
which dictate change. It does mean, however, that the nurse is aware
of both her professional responsibilities and legal liabilities. Just as the
nurse must solve nursing problems, so must the hospital administrator
and doctor find other solutions for those problems which are properly
theirs.
With this degree of confusion still existing in hospitals, it was prob-
ably not too startling to have seen it reflected in the courts. From the
cases, we know that when a nurse's negligence is at issue, the term
malpractice does not apply to her because she is not required to use
independent judgment on matters which mean the difference between
life and death; 135 nor is expert testimony required to determine the
propriety of her allegedly negligent acts.136 However, the courts have
determined that the nurse is negligent if she: 1) fails to follow the doc-
tor's order because of faulty judgment; 137 2) follows the doctor's order
but should have made an independent judgment not to; 138 3) fails to
take proper precautions when an improper order has been written; 139
or 4) fails to report medical treatment to higher medical and adminis-
trative authority, when in the exercise of independent judgment, she
knows it to be improper. 140 The contradictions are so blatant as to re-
quire no further comment.
The observation has been made141 that the nurse is moving away
from her traditional role in the hospital hierarchy and is beginning to
take her place as a partner with the physician. The consequences of this
irreversible trend are still in the embryonic state. They have, however,
assumed a significant identity through those emerging concepts of tort
liability which have had a demonstrable impact on the hospital nurse.
135 Richardson v. Doe, supra note 119.
136 Jones v. Hawkes Hospital of Mt. Carmel, supra note 111.
137 Adams v. State, supra note 82.
138 Arnold v. Haggin Memorial Hospital, supra note 83.
139 Campbell v. Preston, supra note 84.
140 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital, supra note 1.
141 67 Am. J., Nursing 1 (Jan. 1967).
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